A Synopsis of
A General Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles S. Peirce
by
James Jakób Liszka
Dept. of Philosophy
Univ. of Alaska Anchorage
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Published by Indiana University Press, 1996
151pp, 6x9, figs, notes, refs., index
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1: The Discipline of Semeiotic
Semeiotic as a formal science
The place of semeiotic in the system of sciences
The role of semeiotic in the system of sciences
The divisions of semeiotic
Semeiotic as a coenoscopic science
A general characterization of semeiotic
Semeiotic and semiology compared as a discipline
Chapter 2: Semeiotic Grammar
The general formal conditions of signs
The ground of a sign
The object of a sign
The interpretant of a sign
The triadic relation
The typology of signs
The typology of signs in regard to their presentative character
The typology of signs in regard to their representative character
The typology of signs in regard to their interpretative power
The classification of signs
Chapter 3: Critical Logic
The basis of critical logic
The anatomy of arguments
Deduction
System of existential graphs as a representation of natural deduction
Induction
Abduction
Other forms of reasoning
The process of reasoning
The validity of the ultimate leading principles of the three forms of
reasoning
Chapter 4: Universal Rhetoric
The formal conditions for community
Universal rhetoric as the formal study of communication
The teleology of communication
Universal rhetoric as a study of the formal conditions of inquiry
Methods of settling opinion
The community of inquiry
The teleology of sign development and the growth of concrete reasonableness
Notes
References
Index
A Synopsis of Chapters and
Sections
CHAPTER 1: THE DISCIPLINE OF SEMEIOTIC
Semeiotic as a formal science
Semeiotic is defined by Peirce as a formal science, meaning that it searches
for the essential conditions of signs, what makes something a sign, regardless
of its manifestations. The nature of formal sciences is discussed. Mathematics
is considered to be the formal science par excellence, since it studies
the form of form. The various branches of philosophy, phenomenology, normative
philosophy, and metaphysics, are also considered formal sciences, but not as
purely so as mathematics, since they derive their results from the observation
and study of phenomena in their ordinary context, as opposed to their pure
abstract forms. Semeiotic is a branch of normative philosophy which also
includes ethics and aesthetics.
The place of semeiotic in the system of sciences
Peirce's classification of the theoretical sciences, and the position of semeiotic in the system is discussed. In his later years, Peirce attempted a systematic classification of the theoretical sciences:
I. Formal Sciences
A. Mathematics
1. of logic
2. of discrete series
3. of continua
B. Philosophy
C. Phenomenology
D. Normative science
1. Aesthetics
2. Ethics
3. Semeiotic
a. Grammar
b. Critical logic
c. Universal rhetoric
E. Metaphysics
II. Physical Sciences
A. Nomological physics
B. Classificatory physics
1. crystallography
2. chemistry
3. biology
C. Descriptive physics
1. geognosy
2. astronomy
III. Psychical Sciences
A. Nomological psychics
B. Classificatory psychics
1. special psychology
2. linguistics
3. ethnology
C. Descriptive psychics
1. history
2. biography
3. criticism
Mathematics is an iconoscopic science in that it gets its result from the
observation of formal diagrams and other icons; philosophy is coenoscopic in
that it gets its result from the observation of phenomena in their ordinary
life context, while, the physical and psychological sciences are idioscopic, in
the sense that they get their results from observation in controlled
experiments or in nature.
The role of semeiotic in the system of sciences
The hierarchical relation of the sciences is discussed, and the particular
role that semeiotic plays in the system is outlined. The empirical or
idioscopic sciences are dependent upon the formal sciences, since all phenomena
have form. Within the formal sciences, mathematics is the highest, since it is
the study of the form of form, i.e., it is the only pure formal science.
Whereas mathematics is the study of form, philosophy is the study of the form
of such-and-such, and, consequently, a less pure formal science.
Phenomenology is the study of the form of appearances, the normative sciences study
the formal conditions of the evaluation of phenomena, in terms of their truth,
goodness and beauty, while metaphysics is the study of the formal conditions
for what counts something as real. Semeiotic is more specifically the study of
the formal conditions of signs as such, and their ability to convey information
and attain some level of truth. Since all empirical sciences rely on signs, the
physical and psychological sciences depend on the results of semeiotic. Specifically,
what semeiotic supplies are the leading principles of investigation by which
the empirical sciences can study particular phenomena. Given its position
within the formal sciences, semeiotic is dependent upon the results of
mathematics and phenomenology. Still Peirce insists that the relation is not a
one-way dependence. The results of the empirical sciences can help to refine
and correct the formal study of signs.
The divisions of semeiotic
Semeiotic is divided into grammar, critic and rhetoric, which are given various
names throughout Peirce's lifetime. Grammar is the study of the formal
conditions of signs as such, critic is a study of the formal conditions of
truth, while rhetoric is concerned with the formal conditions for the
attainment of truth and consensus within some community.
Semeiotic as a coenoscopic science
The nature of a coenoscopic science is investigated. Even though semeiotic
is a formal science it is an eminently fallible one, since it relies on
coenoscopic observation, that is, the observation of signs as they occur in
ordinary contexts. It is also in a peculiar position, since one of its primary
objects of study is the means by which we use the observation, inference and
evaluation of signs to arrive at knowledge. Consequently, it must employ the
very things it studies in order to arrive at its own results. This makes it a
"bootstrap" science.
A general characterization of semeiotic
Semeiotic can now be characterized as a formal science interested in
determining those necessary and essential conditions for the character and
employment of signs. It has three branches: the study of the necessary
conditions which count anything as a sign as such (semeiotic grammar), the
establishment of criteria for counting something as true by inferences from and
through signs (critical logic), and the determination of the conditions for the
communication and development of signs (universal rhetoric). Semeiotic is
primarily a normative science, since it is concerned with signs in regard to
the question of truth value. It is a coenoscopic science, meaning that it draws
upon common everyday experience of signs as its data base. It is a pivotal
science, since its role in the system of sciences is to provide leading
principles for any investigation that studies particular phenomenon. At the
same time, it uses the results of the empirical sciences to refine its own
findings. In turn, semeiotic receives its leading principles from mathematics
and phenomenology, and its normative guides from ethics and aesthetics.
Semeiotic and semiology compared as a discipline
A comparison between Saussure's understanding of the science of semiology
and Peirce's study of semeiotic is made. Understood as a discipline (and not
considering the differing theories of sign), semiology is markedly different
from semeiotic. Saussure, the founder of semiology, saw it as a branch of
psychology, specifically social psychology. Thus, it was treated as one
empirical discipline among others, and ultimately dependent upon results in
psychology. For Peirce, semeiotic plays a more important role in the system of
sciences as articulated previously. It is a pivotal science that clarifies the
leading principles by which all investigations, including psychology, should
take place.
CHAPTER 2: SEMEIOTIC GRAMMAR
The general formal conditions of signs
The formal conditions of the sign are articulated. In his various
definitions, Peirce points to three essential conditions for a sign: a sign in
order to be a sign must be about something (its object); it must convey
something about the thing it's about (its ground); and it must convey to
something else, something about the thing it's about (its interpretant). Thus,
the sign has three essential components: ground, object and interpretant. In addition,
the relation between these three elements in any given sign is triadic, hence
irreducible to any pairs of dyadic relations among the basic elements.
The ground of a sign
The notion of ground is discussed. The ground of the sign is set of particular
qualities present in the sign which serves as the basis of representation of
its object for the interpretant. Its role is to mediate between object and
interpretant, that is, to schematize an object so that it can be interpreted by
some sign agency.
The object of a sign
The character of the object is investigated. There are two kinds of objects,
the dynamic and the immediate. The dynamic object serves to determine and
constrain the sign process relevant to it, while the immediate object is the
dynamic object as represented in the sign, and so serves as the means by which
the sign is correlated to an object by some interpretant. Thus, there are two
functions which the object serves in the sign process: determination and
correlation.
The interpretant of a sign
The matter of the interpretant is analyzed. The interpretant of a sign is
the process by which the sign becomes informative for some sign agency. That is
to say, in the interpretant, the sign conveys information by saying something
(conveying some quality) about the object it represents. The interpretant can
be understood as a particular product, that is, another sign which
translates that sign, making it informative or more informative than the sign
it translates; but also as the process of that translation, or, finally,
as the effect which the sign has on the sign agency qua information.
There are several types of interpretant, but the three principal types are the
immediate, or the unanalyzed effect a sign has on an interpreting agency, the
dynamic, or, the ability of the sign to convey some actual information, and the
final, which is the systematic connection of that sign with the state of
information in the sign agency.
The triadic relation
The character of triadic relation is analyzed. The ground, object, and interpretant must maintain a triadic relation in order for something to count as a sign. The ground without the object, or the object without the interpretant cannot make something into a sign. Each of the three primary elements of the sign are related through each other. A sign becomes a sign only when it is established as representing an object by some interpretant, and it can only do so if there is some ground for its representation, but the possibility of that is created by the object of the sign. Attenuation to the triadic character of signs generates different types of semeioses: teleological semeiosy is capable of creating genuine signs, such as symbols; teleonomic semeiosy employs patterns of indurated interpretants, while mechanical semeiosy is the case where the interpretant is causally produced.
The typology of signs
Typologies are concerned with discerning the various types or classes of signs, while classification is concerned with their organization. Peirce develops four different typologies, an original in "On a New List of Categories," an interim in 1903, an expanded version in 1904, and the final version in 1908. The 1903 version remains the most formulated, and is also the one associated with his classification of signs. It is used here as the basis of Peirce's sign typology.
The typology of signs in regard to their presentative character
The presentative character of the sign is the features it has qua sign which
serve as the basis of its capacity to represent some object. If it is the
qualities of the sign as such that perform this function, then it is called a
qualisign. If it is its locative (temporal, spatial or existential) properties
that serve this function, then it is called a sinsign; and if it is its conventional
or natural patterns that do so, then it is a legisign.
The typology of signs in regard to their representative character
The representative character of the sign is its ability to correlate with some object. If this is done by means of similarity, so that the sign is in some sense like its object, then it is called an icon. Icons are subdivided into the following: if its features are shared by the object it represents then it is called an image; if the arrangement of its features is isomorphic to the arrangement of the features of the object, then it is a diagram; if its representative character is shown to be parallel to the representative character of its object, then it is called a metaphor.
If the sign correlates with its object by some means of contiguity, then it is called an index. If there is a direct continuity between the sign and its object, then it is called deictic; it is called causal, if its object is the cause of the sign, and it is called a label if it is conventionally associated with its object.
If the sign correlates with its object through some conventional, habitual,
dispositional, or lawlike relation, then it is called a symbol. If the object
is correlates with is of a general kind, then it is called a genuine symbol, if
it is a singular object, then it is called a singular symbol, and if the object
is some character or quality, then it is called an abstract symbol.
The typology of signs in regard to their interpretative power
The interpretative character of the sign is the sign's capability of
directing or determining its interpretant toward a certain focus in the
interpretation of the object. It is generally, its capacity to enter into a
systematic relation with other signs. If the sign is a rheme, it will have a tendency
to determine the interpretant to focus on the qualitative characteristics of
the sign. In general it focuses on the sense of a sign. A dicent connects signs
with other signs in a higher interpretative organization. The proposition is a
paradigm of the dicent, since it connects breadth and depth, sense and
reference in a sign. An argument is a sign that connects signs with other signs
in an even higher level of organization. An inference is an example of an
argument.
The classification of signs
The various types of signs can be organized into interrelated classes with the following rules:
1. the composition rule: each class will have an element from the three types; that is, each class will consist in a presentative, representative and interpretative type.
2. the qualification rule: based on some of the leading principles of phenomenology, the presentative aspect of a sign can only be combined with representative aspects which are equal to or lower than the presentative's phenomenological type; similarly the representative aspect of the sign can only be combined with interpretative aspects which are equal to or lower than the representative's phenomenological type. This reduces 27 possible classes of signs to 10:
1. rhematic iconic qualisigns
2. rhematic iconic sinsigns
3. Rhematic indexical sinsigns
4. dicentic indexical sinsigns
5. rhematic iconic legisigns
6. Rhematic indexical legisigns
7. Dicentic indexical legisigns
8. Rhematic symbolic legisigns
9. Dicentic symbolic legisigns
10. Argumentative symbolic legisigns
3. The dominance rule suggests that although every sign requires an element from each of the three trichotomies of signs, some subset will predominate over the others.
4. The instantiation rule claims that all signs in order to count as such must be instantiated, therefore expressed in some sinsign.
5. The inclusion rule argues that within the same aspect of the sign, the division with the higher phenomenological status involves the divisions with lower ones. Thus a sinsign always involves a qualisign, and an legisign always involves a sinsign.
The characteristics of each of the ten classes of signs are discussed.
CHAPTER 3: CRITICAL LOGIC
Whereas semeiotic grammar is concerned with the formal conditions of signs
as such, their types and classification, critical logic is concerned to
establish the leading principles by which signs can be used to ascertain truth.
The basis of critical logic
Critical logic is the study of valid inferencing and the conditions for the
truth of propositions. It is dependent on mathematics for its leading
principles, but whereas mathematics is concerned with necessary reasoning per
se, and the consequences of propositions without regard to their truth, logic
is concerned with reasoning about the truth of propositions. Formal
logic is the application of mathematical reasoning to the discernment of valid
and invalid reasoning, and is, strictly speaking, part of mathematics. It can
be argued that Peirce's logic of relations is more a case of mathematical logic
than critical logic. The logic of relatives is concerned with the form of
relation in all its generality and in its different possible species. Peirce
shows in his logic of relations that the relation of inclusion is the most
fundamental logical relation, and serves as the basis for all logical
inferences.
The anatomy of arguments
Analysis of the constituent parts of arguments and their classification is
part of the job of critical logic. Any argument can be analyzed into the
following parts: the leading principle, the premises, the colligation,
involvement, and the conclusion. Premises are colligated with one
another in order to infer the conclusion. Involvement is the transference of
facts from premises to conclusion. The conclusion is the product of the
argument. The leading principle is the habit of thought validating the
inference from premise to conclusion. There are three main types of inferences
with their corresponding leading principles: deduction, induction and
abduction. Determining the validity of an argument depends on determining the
truth of its leading principle.
Deduction
Logical deduction is an inference which shows a necessary connection among premises and the conclusion, such that if the premises were true, the conclusion would be too. Necessary reasoning is reasoning from diagrams in the broad sense of the term. Diagrammatic reasoning constructs a diagram according to a precept expressed in general terms, performs experiments upon the diagram, and notes the results. Diagrammatic reasoning has two species, corollarial and theorematic. Corollarial deduction is one which represents the conditions of the conclusion in the diagram and, from observation of the diagram, determines the truth of the conclusion, for example, the way in which a Venn diagram might illustrate the truth of a conclusion in logic. Theorematic deduction is on which, having represented the conditions of the conclusion in the diagram, performs an experiment upon the diagram and, by observation of the diagram so modified, ascertains the truth of the conclusion. This sort of reasoning is illustrated in many of proofs in Euclidean geometry.
In general deduction can be thought of as an inference which allow us to
expand or complicate a system of information just on the basis of the
information already present. Statistical and probabilistic deductions are also
discussed.
System of existential graphs as a representation of natural deduction
A brief account of Peirce's existential graphs is given. Peirce intended
them to be a means of expressing natural deduction, that is, a deductive logic
which assumes a number of inference types. It was meant originally as an
educational tool that could be taught to boys and girls before grammar.
Induction
There are three types of induction: crude, quantitative and qualitative.
Crude induction is the weakest kind, and involves denying that a certain kind
of event ever will occur on the ground that it never has or seldom has
occurred. Quantitative inductions are statistical samples. If we want to
determine whether an individual member of a class, P, has some character, Q,
this is accomplished by taking a fair sample of the Ps; an estimate of the
proportion of that sample which has Q then suggests that the entire class of P
has the same proportion. The conditions for fair sample are discussed.
Qualitative induction is the sort of induction involved in the confirmation of
a hypothesis.
Abduction
Whereas deduction is concerned with showing the necessary connection between
bits of information in a system, and induction concerned to show that something
can count as reliable information, abduction introduces candidates for
information. Expressed in the context of the practice of science, abduction is
a process of reasoning that introduces plausible hypotheses to solve anomalies
or puzzles. A hypothesis is considered plausible if it is a relevant explanation
of the anomaly or puzzle that generates it. In addition, the hypothesis must be
likely if it is to be deemed worthy of testing. A hypothesis is likely if it
employs well-received scientific concepts, and does not call for rare or
unusual events. A hypothesis must also show economy in order to be considered
for testing, meaning that the time, energy and expense of testing the
hypothesis should also be a factor in its consideration.
Other forms of reasoning
An examination of analogy and metaphoric reasoning. Also the various reasoning processes involved in coenoscopic observation, including restriction, determination, descent, depletion, extension, prescision, abstraction and ascent. These are reasoning concerning relation among parts in a whole, the relation of parts to a whole, and the comparison and contrast of parts to parts and wholes to wholes.
The process of reasoning
Reasoning for Peirce is a living process that occurs with the nexus of
inquiry, and inquiry is a practice that interrelates abduction, deduction and
induction into a continuing cycle that ultimately leads to a convergence and
consensus of truth. Abduction is the process of reasoning which introduces
plausible hypotheses for testing. It generates these hypotheses in the context
of some anomaly or puzzle it hopes to solve, and which is brought about by the
failure of existing hypotheses or information. Deduction is the process of
reasoning by which one derives the testable consequences from hypotheses, while
induction is the process of reasoning by which one tests or confirms them.
Historical examples are used to illustrate this process.
The validity of the ultimate leading principles of the three forms of reasoning
The central question of critical logic is the validity of the leading principles of the three basic forms of reasoning, deduction, induction and abduction. However, although each of these inferences and their subtypes have a variety of leading principles, each form of reasoning has an ultimate leading principle which serves as the basic guide for all inferences of its particular type. The ultimate leading principle of deduction is that if a particular logic principle is valid, then in an analogous case will it lead to a false conclusion from true premises. The ultimate leading principle of induction is that a method such as induction if steadily adhered to, would at length lead to an indefinite approximation to the truth. The ultimate leading principle of abduction is that the human mind is akin to the truth in the sense that in a finite number of guesses it will light upon the correct hypothesis.
The three ultimate leading principles are intimately connected with Peirce's
convergence theory of truth, and form its axioms. If truth is what corresponds
to the final outcome of a process of inquiry informed by reasoning process that
results for the most part in attaining truth, then it must be presupposed that
there are methods of reasoning which, when applied to the matter at hand, yield
a good result. Peirce claims that the ultimate leading principles cannot be
justified empirically, nor by an inference, since that would result in
circularity. Indeed, he notes the apparent circularity of his position: what
makes inferences ultimately valid is the claim that inquiry, if pursued by
means of them, will ultimately light upon the truth; yet our faith in inquiry
as a means of truth convergence rests in the confidence in these types of
inference. The other alternative is to suggest something like a Kantian
solution, in which the very condition of the possibility of discovering truth
must lie in these ultimate leading principles. Peirce might be considered to
treat these ultimate leading principles as regulative principles in the Kantian
sense: just as we must presuppose freedom in order to have anything like
morality, the ultimate leading principles must be presupposed in order to have
anything like inquiry. Consequently, the leading principles articulated by
critical logic find their ultimate ground in universal rhetoric which, in its most
comprehensive sense, is the study of the formal conditions for the practice of
inquiry within a community.
CHAPTER 4: UNIVERSAL RHETORIC
Whereas semeiotic grammar is concerned with the formal conditions for
something to count as a sign, and, critical logic is concerned with the formal
conditions for counting a sign as true, universal or speculative rhetoric is
concerned with the formal conditions for the attainment of truth. This
centers on the formal conditions for inquiry. In turn, inquiry takes place
within a community, requires proper communication, and a proper method for
settling opinion. These become the central topics of universal rhetoric.
However, even though much of Peirce's writing can be seen as related to
universal rhetoric, there is no complete or unified account. This makes it
difficult to interpret this particular branch of semeiotic. Various and
disparate sources must be used to make an outline of universal rhetoric.
The formal conditions for community
The first formal condition of having a community is that its members are capable of mediative or sign-interpreting capacity to some degree. The second is that there must be a sensis communis among such sign users, some sort of possibility of a communicative relation. Thirdly, there must be an identification with or ownership of this relation by particular members. Each of these conditions are explicated.
At this level, universal rhetoric is also concerned with articulating the various sentiments that members of a community must have to facilitate inquiry. These include the following rational sentiments:
1. that there is such a thing as truth;
2. not only is there truth, but it can be found out;
3. Truth can be found out primarily by reasoning about it;
4. It is possible for a person to err and to be deceived;
5. Reasoning is superior to other means of settling opinion.
On the whole, inquiry is possible when there is , first, a community, second, whose members have acquired certain sentiments conducive to inquiry, and, three, where the structure of the community itself fits the needs of the practice of inquiry.
Universal rhetoric as the formal study of communication
Communication is a formal condition for the possibility of community. Peirce suggests the following formal conditions for communication
1. there must be an utterer and interpreter.
2. there must be something transmitted between utterer and interpreter.
3. What is transmitted between utterer and interpreter must be something
which is capable of establishing common interpretants in both utterer and
interpreter.
Each of these conditions are elaborated. The third condition points to Peirce's notions of collateral experience, commens, and universe of discourse.
The teleology of communication
Inquiry is possible when there is clear communication among members of the
community. The goal of communication in this respect is determination of the
meanings communicated, understood as a zero latitude of interpretation.
Indeterminancy of propositions are discussed in terms of their vagueness and
generality. Peirce's account of assertion and his nascent speech-act theory are
discussed. The use of collateral experience in determining both the sense and
reference of assertions is outlined.
Universal rhetoric as a study of the formal conditions of inquiry
Having discussed the formal conditions for community and communication, it is now possible to look at the formal character of inquiry understood as a process that is practiced within a community of a certain sort. As previously argued, the leading principles of the three fundamental forms of reasoning, abduction, deduction and induction, lead to the conclusion that truth is the accomplishment of inquiry. Logic is rooted in the "social principle", and suggests a connection with community. Universal rhetoric is concerned with inquiry in the context of community.
Methods of settling opinion
The primary purpose of inquiry is the settlement of opinion and the fixation
of belief, i.e., the achievement of genuine consensus. The five general methods
of settling opinion or fixing beliefs are discussed: the method of tenacity,
authority, the a priori method, the method of public opinion, the method of
investigation or inquiry. The faults and limitations of each method is
presented, and the superiority of the method of investigation is discussed.
The community of inquiry
The basic characteristics of a community of inquiry constituted by the
method of inquiry are discussed. Such a community would encourage
self-criticism and reflection on presently held beliefs (as opposed to
tenacious communities), but only if such reflection is warranted by a genuine
doubt. The community of inquiry would allow and encourage openness towards
criticism (as opposed to authoritative communities). Participants in inquiry
would be allowed the opportunity to criticize, to refute, as well as to present
alternative views. Arbitrary exclusion from this process would be
incomprehensible. The community would also encourage a healthy skepticism (as
opposed to the dogmatic community). Such a community could not employ force or
coercion in its attempt to reach consensus, and, the community would employ
criteria and evidence that had a public quality to it and universal appeal. The
community would use universal consensus as a measure of the truth of a belief.
The teleology of sign development and the growth of concrete reasonableness
Universal rhetoric is also concerned with the purposes and growth of knowledge in a community, that is, in general, it is concerned with teleological action. In a community of inquiry, the growth of information will have a certain effect on sign agencies connected to that community. Knowledge and accurate information will tend a community toward concrete reasonableness, which has the character of an end-in-itself. Peirce's characterization of teleological action as a finious process is discussed, and contrasted with other conceptions of teleology.